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Abstract. People typically set goals in settings where they cannot be sure of how
they will perform, but where their performance is revealed to them in parts over time.
When part of the uncertainty is resolved, initial goals may have turned out to be unreal-
istic and hence they no longer work as a motivation device. Revising goals may increase
performance by making goals realistic, but may also adversely affect performance
through reduced goal commitment. We study the effects of motivating university stu-
dents to set goals and inviting them to revise their goals later, using a field experiment
involving nearly 2,100 students. We use courses containing two midterms and a final
exam, where midterms reduce uncertainty about students’ potential performance. We
find that motivating students to set goals does not affect performance on average. Stu-
dents with midterm grades lower than their goal, decrease their performance. This effect
is driven by students who were motivated to set goals without being made aware that
they can revise their goals later. This finding may help explain why the evidence of the
effectiveness of goals on study performance is mixed.
Keywords: Goal setting; field experiments; economics of education.
1. INTRODUCTION
Goal setting by students, as a means of increasing study performance, is by now a
widely observed phenomenon. However, often the goals students set are not
reached.1 One reason for this may be that at the time students set goals, the uncer-
tainty about the productivity of their effort is typically high. When part of the
uncertainty is resolved, goals may have turned out to be unrealistic, causing these
goals to no longer work as a motivation device. So far there has not been empirical
research on goal setting that takes the reduction of performance uncertainty into
account. Studying this type of uncertainty can help explain the mixed evidence
about the effectiveness of goal setting at university found in the literature.2
In this paper, we study goal setting for university students in courses where
students’ uncertainty about the productivity of their effort is reduced over time.3
1. For example, using data from university students in the Netherlands Van Lent and Souverijn
(2017) find that only 38% of the students reach the goal they had set themselves. Similarly,
Clark et al. (2018) find that 24% to 53% of their students reach their goal.
2. For example, Van Lent and Souverijn (2017) report positive effects, Clark et al. (2018) report no
effects for grade goals and positive effects for number of practice exam goals, and Dobronyi et al.
(2017) report no effects.
3. One reason for studying goal setting at university is that there is a widely held belief that many
students do not exert enough effort. A goal-setting intervention could boost effort and thereby
graduation prospects and eventually labor market outcomes.
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Specifically, students learn about their ability and several aspects of the course
through studying and participation in two midterm exams and thereby uncer-
tainty reduces. We examine i) whether goal setting increases performance ii)
whether emphasizing the possibility of goal revision decreases short-run perfor-
mance, and iii) whether emphasizing the possibility to revise goals that are very
distant from current performance increases subsequent performance. In order to
do so, we run a large-scale field experiment involving almost 2,100 students from
one large European university.
Students are randomly assigned to the control group or one of three treatment
groups and receive a series of three surveys. In addition to questions that all stu-
dents receive, students assigned to a treatment group are asked whether they
want to set grade goals as well as other goals. Students assigned to treatment 1
(T1) are asked whether and what goals they want to set in survey 1 and are
reminded about their goals in survey 2 and 3. In treatment 2 (T2), students are
asked about goals in survey 1, reminded of and invited to revise their goals in
survey 2 and reminded of their (newly set) goals in survey 3. In treatment 3 (T3),
students are asked about their goals in survey 1, but are also informed that they
will be invited to revise their goals in the next survey. Survey 2 and survey 3 are
identical to the surveys that students in T2 receive. Hence, the only difference
between T2 and T3 is whether the invitation to revise goals (in the second sur-
vey) comes as a surprise. The timing of the second and third survey is such that
students receive a survey shortly after taking a midterm exam, and have thereby
received additional information (e.g., about the difficulty of the course or the
grading scheme) before deciding how much effort to exert for the next (mid-
term) exam. When deciding about the treatments, we had to trade-off the inten-
sity of the treatment with the possibility of treatment contamination. The
surveys between the control and treatment groups differ only by a couple of
questions which comes at the risk that the treatment is not intensive enough.
However, by making the treatments more different from the control group – for
instance, by adding more questions or more reminders – we believe that students
from both the control and treatment groups would learn during the treatment
period that an experiment was going on which could induce an experimenter
demand effect.
This experiment is motivated by the idea that goals that turned out to be too
easy or too difficult do not motivate students, leading to lower performance than
when goals would be moderately difficult.4 Revising a goal solves the problem
that the goal is too easy or too difficult, but may create other problems. First,
students may be less motivated to reach revised goals as compared to the initial
goal, for instance, because they are disappointed for having to revise their goal
in the first place. We test this by asking students about goal motivation in all
treatments. Second, if students know from the start that they will be invited to
revise their goals later, they may initially be less motivated to exert effort, simply
because they know that they can revise their goals later. We test this by compar-
ing short-run performance of students assigned to T3 with students assigned to
T1 and T2.
4. See Vroom (1964), and more recently Shah and Higgins (1997), Heath et al. (1999), and Wu et al.
(2008) for evidence in line with this premise.
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Our main findings are the following. We find small and marginally significant
negative effects of the treatment on midterm grades. The treatment effect in the
second midterm is negative and significant for those students who are motivated
to set goals but are not told that they could revise goals from the start, i.e., T1
and T2. The size of the effect is an economically significant 12% to 15% of a
standard deviation. We do not find such an effect for students in T3. For the
final exam, we find no effect of the treatment. An explanation for this is that the
final examination is already a high stakes test. The fact that we find mainly
insignificant results for our treatments is unlikely to be a power issue. We are
able to detect an effect size of 5.5% of a standard deviation, and the standard
errors of the coefficients are small. Focusing on those students who set grade
goals, we find that students who have a grade goal that is very different from
their first midterm grade, subsequently decrease their performance. This effect is
driven by those students who are not made aware that they can revise their
goals.
There is a large literature on the effects of goal setting on performance, see
Locke and Latham (1990, 2002) for a review of the goal-setting literature. Some
of the key mechanisms through which goals affect performance are goal commit-
ment and task complexity, see also Koestner et al. (2002). In the surveys, we ask
students about their commitment toward their goals, and find overall a high goal
commitment. Performance in a university education program can be considered
a complex task in the sense that it is not obvious how increased effort can result
in an increased performance. The goal-setting literature has found that when
task difficulty is higher, the positive effects of goals are smaller, see also Wood
et al. (1987).
Economic theory papers found that goal setting can increase performance for
present biased and loss averse agents, see e.g. Hsiaw (2013), Koch and Nafziger
(2011), Koch et al. (2014), and Suvorov and Van de Ven (2008). However, only
very recently Koch and Nafziger (2016) showed how goal setting can impact per-
formance under uncertainty in a dynamic setting.
In addition to the economic theory literature, there is an increasing number
of empirical studies investigating the effects of goal setting on performance in
the laboratory and in the field. See for instance Brookins et al. (2017), Corgnet
et al. (2015, 2018), Dalton et al. (2016), Koch and Nafziger (2017), Markle et al.
(2018), and Uetake and Yang (2018), and for experimental studies about goal set-
ting with university students, see e.g., Clark et al. (2018), Dobronyi et al. (2017),
and Van Lent and Souverijn (2017). In Van Lent and Souverijn (2017) goals are
set during one-on-one interviews between students and their randomly assigned
mentor. The goal-setting intervention takes at most five minutes and increases
students’ grades by 9% of a standard deviation. Dobronyi et al. (2017) implement
an online goal-setting intervention in which students complete structured goal-
setting exercises related to study performance but also related to other aspects of
life. They find no impact of the goal-setting intervention on students’ study per-
formance. Clark et al. (2018) study goal setting of university students using a sur-
vey, and students are reminded about their goal each time they received a new
grade. Clark et al. (2018) find that grade goals do not affect performance, but
goals with respect to the number of practice exams increases performance for
male students. Finally, psychologists and management scientists have also
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studied goal setting by university students, see e.g., Ames and Archer (1988), Bet-
tinger and Baker (2013), Linnenbrink (2005), Morisano et al. (2010), Schippers
et al. (2015), Schunk (1990), and Travers et al. (2015). In most of these studies
however, there is no control group, which makes it impossible to estimate a cau-
sal effect from motivating students to set goals.
In order to learn what drives the average null finding of being asked to set
goals, we explore heterogeneity along several dimensions. We focus on i) self-re-
ported differences in the amount of uncertainty; ii) time preferences; and iii)
task/course motivation. We find no evidence that heterogeneity in uncertainty
or differences in course motivation are important mechanisms.
One of the insights that this study provides is that one should not expect goal
setting to always increase performance. Encouraging students to set goals using
surveys may not be a strong enough intervention, and may even decrease perfor-
mance for some students.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain the experi-
mental context and set up. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy. Followed
by sections 4 and 5 in which we describe the data and explain the results. The
last section discusses our findings and conclude.
2. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
2.1. Experimental context
Our experiment involved nearly 2,100 first-year and second-year students
enrolled in several undergraduate programs at the Erasmus University Rotterdam
during the 2016–17 academic year. The academic year is divided in five blocks of
eight weeks (seven weeks of lectures and tutorials followed by one week of
exams). In each block students take 12 study credits (ECTS) worth of courses. For
first-year and second-year students all courses are mandatory. Hence, all students
in our sample within a study program take the exact same courses.
Students typically take two courses in each block, one course worth 8 ECTS
and a smaller 4 ECTS course. For first-year students, we implement our experi-
ment during the 8 ECTS course Microeconomics, and for the second-year stu-
dents we implement our experiment during the 8 ECTS course Applied
Microeconomics. The 4 ECTS course that students take depends on the study
program that the student is enrolled in.5
The final grade that students receive for the courses of interest are based on
two midterm exams (worth 10% of the final grade each) followed by a final exam
which counts for the remaining 80%. It is exactly the composition and timing of
the components of the grades that makes this setting suitable to answer our
research question, as we will further explain in the next subsection.
5. Students enrolled in the first year programs Economics & Business Economics and Econometrics
take respectively a course in ICT and Calculus at the same time as the Microeconomics course.
Students enrolled in the second year take the course History of Economic Thought at the same
time as Applied Microeconomics.
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2.2. Experimental design
Students are asked to complete the surveys on their mobile phones or laptops
during tutorials, taught by tutorial teachers. Attending these tutorials is manda-
tory for first-year students, but not for second-year students. For the timing of
the exams and surveys see Figure 1.
We randomly select a subset of the students and ask them whether they want
to set goals. First, we ask whether students want to set grade goals (and what
goal their grade goal is), and then ask whether they want to set other goals, such
as an amount of study hours or preparing for each tutorial.6 We ask the students
about non-grade goals because some students may be more interested in setting
these type of goals, and since non-grade goals may be more effective for some
students. Note that we explicitly included the option for students to choose not
to set any goals. Further, students are made aware that their survey responses
will not be disclosed to any of their teachers, hence there is no reason for stu-
dents to fill in these questions strategically.
In one treatment (T3), we inform students that in the second survey they will
be invited to revise their goals, while in the other treatments (T1 and T2) we do
not. In addition, we have a control group in which students are not motivated
to set any goals, but are (just like in the treatment groups) asked questions about
their preferences, behaviors, opinions, characteristics, and motivations. Since stu-
dents fill in the surveys during their tutorials the probability of contamination is
higher if students within a tutorial group would receive different surveys. We
therefore randomize students into one of the treatments or the control group
based on the tutorial group level.
After the first survey, students take the first midterm exam. Directly after the
examination, students receive the second survey. Students in T1 are only
reminded about their goals, while students in T2 and T3 are also invited to revise
any of their goals. While students who are assigned to T3 knew that they would
be granted the opportunity to revise their goals, this opportunity comes as a sur-
prise for the students in T2. After the second midterm, students receive the third
and final survey. In this last survey treated students are again reminded about
their goals. Figure 2 shows the difference between the control and treatment
Figure 1 Planning of the course and surveys. The vertical axis represents time
6. To be precise, the question we use in T1 and T2 is: “Do you want to set yourself a [grade/ non-
grade] goal for [coursename]?” and the question in T3 is “Do you want to set yourself a [grade/
non-grade] goal for [coursename]? Note that you can decide to change your goal after the first
midterm”.
Goal Setting, Information, and Goal Revision
© 2019 The Authors. German Economic Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of German Economic Association (Verein f€ur Socialpolitik) 5
groups for each survey. For more detail about the survey questions in each group
and survey wave see the Supplementary Appendix S1.
We randomized treatment assignment based on tutorial group and stratify the
randomization by teaching assistant and study program. Teaching assistants typi-
cally teach multiple tutorial groups. Since some of the shocks in student produc-
tivity will be teaching assistant specific, we always have a mix of treatment
groups for teaching assistants who teach more than one group.7 We also stratify
our randomization on study program, since students in different programs take
different courses, and since students in some study programs generally perform
better than students who are selected into other programs as historical data
showed. Finally, after students completed their survey, they were not able to
review the questions.
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We estimate the effects of asking students to set goals, of inviting students to
revise their goals, and the timing of this invitation, on various performance mea-
sures. We estimate an intention-to-treat effect because not all students filled in
the survey. First, we estimate the effects of being asked to set goals, and then we
estimate the effects separately per treatment:
yi ¼ a0 þ a1Gi þ a1Xi þ ei
yi ¼ b0 þ b1T1iþ b2T2i þ b3T3i þ b4Xi þ ei
where yi is student i
0s study performance. Our main variable of interest is stu-
dents’ grades. Since across courses (and instruction language) the grade distribu-
tion varies we standardize grades by taking student i’s grade, subtract it by the
mean grade of the course and then divide it by the standard deviation. The tim-
ing of the exams allows us to separate the responses to the treatment in the
short, medium, and long run. Hence, as an outcome variable for grade, yi, we use
students’ grades for the first midterm, the second midterm, the final exam, and
the final grade (which is a weighted average of the midterm and final exam). In
addition to grades, we study self-reported effort measures and tutorial attendance
Figure 2 Differences in survey content between the control and treatment groups for
each wave
7. Note that teaching assistants were only aware that students had to fill in surveys, not that there
were different survey versions or that the students were part of an experiment.
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as proxies of study effort. G is a dummy that equals one if the student is assigned
to a treatment, and T1, T2, T3 are dummies for respectively treatment 1, 2, and
3. Further, X denotes a rich set of control variables, including students’ gender
and GPA prior to the experiment, and characteristics of the tutorial teachers (i.e.,
gender and previous teaching experience).
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We targeted nearly 2,100 students from two cohorts to participate in a series of
surveys. Of this group, 55% of the students (i.e., 1,134 students) filled in the first
survey. Table 1a shows a test of balance between treatments for the variables of
interest. Based on observables, treatment groups do not differ in terms of GPA
prior to the experiment, but there are differences in the fraction of male students
assigned to treatment and control groups. The fraction of male students is lower
in treatment 3 as compared to the other groups. We control for these covariates
in all the regressions.
Since the first survey differs between treatment groups and the control group
we cannot rule out that students in some groups are more likely to stop partici-
pating in subsequent surveys than in others. Selective drop out of the surveys
leads to challenges in the estimation of within student differences measured by
the surveys (e.g., differences in student motivation and perceived uncertainty).
Table 1b tests whether there is selective drop out from survey participation. The
covariates Survey 1, Survey 1 and 2, and Survey 1, 2, and 3 are dummies that
equal 1 if a student filled in the first survey only, the first and second survey
only, and all surveys, respectively. Students are more likely to fill in the survey
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Covariates Mean Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 F-test
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Gender and grades
Prior GPA 6.67 0.01 0.93 0.03 0.69 0.06 0.39 0.79
Male 0.71 0.02 0.40 0.01 0.70 0.07 0.01 0.02
R2 0.001 0.001 0.004
p-value on F-statistic 0.84 0.33 0.04
(b) Survey participation
Survey 1 0.55 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.37 0.06 0.04 0.00
Survey 1 & 2 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.48 0.00
Survey 1, 2, and 3 0.24 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.11
R2 0.006 0.004 0.008
p-value on F-statistic 0.00 0.03 0.00
Columns (2)–(7) report the coefficients and p-values from OLS regressions of each covariate on three
indicators (one for each treatment). Column (8) reports p-values for joint test of significance of the
three treatment indicators.
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in the control group and in T3 as compared to the other groups. One reason for
the differences is likely to be that some teachers gave more time and opportunity
to students to fill out the survey during class. Further analysis on the survey par-
ticipation shows that there is a positive correlation between participating in the
survey and tutorial attendance (which makes sense given that the students were
supposed to fill in the surveys during class), but no differences in terms of GPA
prior to the course, nor for treatment group students, the distance between the
grade goal and midterm exam performance.
Table 2 provides data on goal setting separated by treatment. It is ambiguous
whether students should be more willing to set goals when they know they have
the opportunity to revise their goals later. On the one hand, students may be
more willing to set a goal since they are able to revise goals that seem too easy
or too difficult early on. On the other hand, students may be less motivated to
reach (and therefore set) goals if they allow themselves to deviate from them
later. From Table 2, we see that a large majority of students is willing to set goals,
and that offering the opportunity to revise goals later does not affect students’
willingness to set a goal. Initially, students who are informed that they can revise
their goals later, set lower grade goals. We elicited goal motivation by asking
how realistic students think their goal is and how important it is for them to
reach this goal. We see that there are no differences based on students’ responses
to these questions. Further, students’ willingness to set goals is independent of
their time preferences. Finally, students are more willing to set grade goals as
compared to other goals. Among the most frequently set non-grade goals are
goals regarding: study hours, deeper understanding of the study materials, and
making homework exercises. Hence, although the question eliciting non-grade
goals did not impose much structure on the goals students can set, we observe
that students set mostly specific and measurable goals, as the psychology litera-
ture on goal setting recommends.
Using data from the second survey, we see that 10% of the students who set a
goal in treatment 2 or 3 revises their goals when asked. This fraction does not
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of goal setting by treatment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Fraction of students who sets a grade goal 0.70 0.70 0.70
Fraction of student who sets a non-grade goal 0.45 0.45 0.48
Fraction of students who sets a goal 0.83 0.84 0.82
Mean grade goal 8.00 7.92 7.88
Standard deviation grade goal 1.00 0.99 0.85
My grade goal is realistic 3.86 4.00 4.00
How important . . . to reach this grade goal 3.19 3.19 3.21
Observations 251 265 306
The sample here consists of those students who filled in (at least) the first survey. The answer to the
statement ‘My grade goal is realistic’ is measured on a 5-point scale with 1 = Strongly disagree,
2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree. The anwer to the question
‘How important do you find it to: reach this goal’ is measured on a 4-point scale with 1 = Not at all
important, 2 = Not that important, 3 = Important, 4 = Very important.
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differ between treatments. Goal revision is unrelated to the absolute distance
between the first midterm exam grade and the grade goal the student sets. We
expected students to revise their grade goal when a goal turned out to be too
easy or too difficult. Under the assumption that students feel that their goal is
realistic is at least partly based on the distance between grade goal and perfor-
mance, this finding is surprising. Finally we do see that students whose perceived
uncertainty has decreased are more likely to revise their goal, see Table A1
(p = 0.131).
One key assumption throughout this paper is that over time the uncertainty
of students decreases. Table 3 shows that indeed students’ perceived uncertainty
regarding what they should do in order to obtain a certain grade has decreased
after the first midterm exam. Further, we see as expected that perceived uncer-
tainty is not affected by the treatment.
5. RESULTS
5.1. Main results
We are interested in the effects of asking students to set goals, and the effects of
inviting students to revise their goals on study performance. We start by analyz-
ing the short-run effects by examining students’ grades for the first midterm
exam. The first two columns of Table 4 show the effect of the treatment on stu-
dent performance in the first midterm. In the short run, motivating students to
set goals has a small and marginally significant negative effect (p = 0.092). The
treatment 3 coefficient is not significantly different from the other coefficients.
This implies that making salient that students can revise their goals later, does
not affect performance negatively in the short run. This is in line with the earlier
finding that offering the opportunity to revise goals later did not change initial
goal motivation (see also Table 2).
Table 3 The perceived uncertainty decreases over time, but no difference by
treatment
Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Sample: participants survey 1
Uncertainty S1: mean 1.39 1.44 1.38 1.31
Standard deviation 1.08 1.12 1.05 1.13
Observations 312 251 265 304
Sample: participants survey 1 & 2
Uncertainty S1: mean 1.33 1.38 1.44 1.33
Standard deviation 1.07 1.08 1.02 1.14
Uncertainty S2: mean 1.58 1.63 1.60 1.56
Standard deviation 1.08 1.14 1.12 1.16
Observations 210 176 151 205
The value of uncertainty is between 0 and 3, with a higher score implying less uncertainty. A t-test
shows that for the control group Uncertainty S2 is higher than Uncertainty S1 (p < 0.01). This implies
that students’ perceived uncertainty reduces over time.
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Columns three and four display the effects on students’ performance in mid-
term 2. Goal setting decreases performance on average with 10% of a standard
deviation (p = 0.054). The effect is driven by students in T1 and T2. Performance
for these groups decreases by 12% to 15% of a standard deviation. Students in T3
do not perform significantly different from the control group. This indicates that
in the medium run, students who set a goal and were not informed at the start
that they can revise their goals later, perform worse than the control group,
while explicitly offering the opportunity to revise goals seem to have neither a
positive nor a negative effect.
The final exam has the largest impact on students’ final grade. Columns five
and six show that the treatments have no effect on performance in the final
exam, the coefficients are close to zero and precisely estimated. One interpreta-
tion for this finding is that the final exam is already a high stake environment,
since students can only take a limited number of resits at the end of the aca-
demic year, and hence goal setting cannot push students any further (or hold
them back). First-year students who do not pass all their courses after resits in
the summer cannot continue their education program and are forced to stop
their studies and are not allowed to resubscribe for one year. Columns seven and
eight show the effects on the final grades, which is a weighted average of the
midterms and final exam. Motivating students to set goals does not have an
overall effect on students’ grades. We also measured the effects of our treatments
on self-reported effort and tutorial attendance which are alternative effort mea-
sures, see Table A2. We find small and insignificant results that are in line with
the findings displayed in Table 4.
Next we consider heterogeneity of the treatment effect, based on students’
GPA before the experiment, and gender. We find that GPA prior to the




Midterm I Midterm II Final exam Final grade
Goal treatments
combined
0.12* 0.10* 0.02 0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
T1 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
T2 0.13* 0.15** 0.01 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
T3 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.03
(0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2.076 2.076 2.076 2.076 2.076 2.076 2.076 2.076
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is standardized by subtracting the mean
and dividing by the st.dev. Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics, study
program, and GPA prior to the experiment.
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experiment is positively correlated with performance during the experiment, and
that goal setting increases performance for below average GPA students (and
decreases performance for above average GPA students), see Table 5, columns 1,
3, 5, and 7.8 Hence, the goal-setting interventions decrease the grade variation
across students. This heterogeneous treatment effect is mostly driven by students
who were not explicitly offered the opportunity to revise their goals (T1), see col-
umns 2, 4, 6, and 8. One explanation for this finding may be that students who
have a higher goal than their midterm grade, give up when the opportunity to
revise goals was not made salient, but less so when the opportunity to revise
goals was emphasized. We further explore this possibility later.
In Table 6, we study whether the treatment effect is heterogeneous based on
students’ gender. We find some indication that goals have a negative effect for
mainly male students in the short run, but no differential effect in the long run.
This is opposite to the findings of Clark et al. (2018). Clark et al. (2018) find posi-
tive effects of goal setting for males and attribute this to students’ time prefer-
ences. As we will show in the next section, there is in our study no
heterogeneous treatment effect based on students’ time preferences.
One reason for finding an average null effect may be that for some students
goals have turned out to be too easy or too difficult and hence no longer work as
a motivation device, while for students who set a realistic goal, the effect is posi-
tive. In order to analyze this, we estimate the effect of the distance between the
grade goal and the first midterm grade on later performance, see Table 7.
We find in line with our prediction that those students who have a lower mid-
term grade than their grade goal subsequently decrease their performance. Stu-
dents who have a first midterm grade that is 1 grade point lower than their goal
decrease their second midterm exam grade by 6% of a standard deviation and
their final grade by 7%. Both these effects are strongly significant (column 1 and
3). If we distinguish between those students who were told that they could revise
their goals in survey 1 (T3) and the other treatments, we find that T3 students
who have a grade that is very different from their goal do not decrease their per-
formance, while those who were not offered the opportunity to revise at the start
decrease performance by 9% to 12%. This suggests that goals that turned out to
be either too easy or too difficult harm future performance, but only when stu-
dents are not made aware from the beginning that they can revise their goals.
5.2. Mechanisms
In the previous section, we established that motivating students to set goals
using surveys has on average no effect on study performance. However, there
may be interesting heterogeneity underlying this finding. Therefore, we now
shed light on some of the mechanisms that may drive the null finding. The
mechanisms we study are: students’ perceived uncertainty about their potential
performance, intrinsic motivation, and time preferences.
8. The finding that motivating students to set goals increases performance for below average GPA
students is in line with Morisano et al. (2010) who find positive effects of a goal setting interven-
tion among poor performing students.
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5.2.1. Uncertainty
Students’ perceived uncertainty about how they will perform (conditional on effort)
may be a reason why goal setting on average does not affect performance. We study
whether there is a heterogeneous treatment effect by students’ perceived uncertainty.
In each of the survey waves, we ask students about this type of uncertainty. To be pre-
cise we ask: ‘Do you find it difficult to estimate how hard you should work in order to pass
the Microeconomics course with a [Grade X]?’. Where we use the most frequent passing
grades: 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0. Answer categories are limited to ‘yes’ and ‘no’.
Students who are uncertain about what they need to do in order to receive
certain grades may set a low grade goal in order to shield themselves from over-
estimating their ability and thereby incurring a loss of not reaching their goal. If
subsequently their first midterm grade is high relative to their goal, then they
may adjust their effort downwards, as compared to similar students in the con-
trol group. On the other hand, students who set a goal that is too high and learn
that they will not reach their goal give up on their goal and thereby decrease
their performance. In Table 8, we report the results of estimating our specifica-
tion separately for the students who report that they do not know how hard
they should work in order to obtain a certain grade, with those students who
answer all the questions with ‘yes’.
Students who perceive high uncertainty decrease performance when being
asked to set goals and students perceiving little uncertainty increase perfor-
mance, although this finding lacks statistical significance. Qualitatively, this find-
ing is in line with the idea that goal setting hurts students who find it difficult
to estimate what they need to do in order to perform a certain way, while stu-
dents who do not perceive such uncertainty benefit from goal setting.
5.2.2. Intrinsic motivation
Students who set themselves goals are typically also intrinsically motivated to
reach their goals. Triggering this type of intrinsic motivation may, however,
Table 7 Distance from the goal and subsequent performance
Dependent variable: Midterm II Final Grade
Distance from the goal 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.09***
(0.19) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Revise treatment 0.05 0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Revise treatment 9 Distance 0.07** 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 569 569 569 569
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses, ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the st.dev. ‘Distance from the goal’ is measured as the absolute difference between the goal and the first
midterm grade, and ‘Revise treatment’ is defined as a dummy that equals 1 if the student has set a goal
in T2 or T3, and equal to zero if the student has set a goal in T1. Control variables: student’s gender,
tutorial teacher characteristics, study program, and GPA prior to the experiment.
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crowd out (or crowd in) intrinsic motivation for the course itself. There is by
now a large literature showing that extrinsic motivation can crowd out intrinsic
motivation, see for instance Benabou and Tirole (2003), and for field experimen-
tal evidence see Huffman and Bognanno (2017). However, the evidence for
crowding out of one intrinsic motivation type (course motivation) for another
(goal motivation) is by our knowledge scarce.
Each survey wave, we ask students to rate their course motivation using two
questions, we ask: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following statements: I find
the course interesting’ and ‘I think the course is useful’. Answers are measured on a
5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Students in treat-
ment groups fill in these questions before they are motivated to set goals (and
are unable to go back to adjust their answers), hence we can compare course
motivation within a student across surveys. In Table 9, we display the effect of
goals on student motivation for the course.
We see that the treatments have no effect on course motivation, i.e., there is
no crowding out or crowding in of motivation for the course as a consequence
of the goal treatments. We see that this is the case for the aggregate course moti-
vation (columns 1 and 2), as well as for students’ response to the two questions
separately, see columns 3 to 6.9
5.2.3. Time preferences
Economic theory has shown that the success of goal setting depends on peoples’
time preferences. Koch and Nafziger (2011) show that present biased people can
Table 8 Heterogeneous treatment effects: perceived uncertainty







Goal treatments combined 0.05 0.04
(0.12) (0.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 211 211 921 921
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is standardized by subtracting the mean
and dividing by the st.dev. Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics, study
program, and GPA prior to the experiment. The sample in column one and two consists of those stu-
dents who responded ‘No’ to the question: ‘Do you find it difficult to estimate how hard you should
work in order to pass the Microeconomics course with a [Grade X]?’ for X = 6, 7, and 8. The sample
in column three and four consists of students who answered ‘Yes’ to at least one of the questions.
9. However, since students selectively drop out of surveys 2, one should be cautious when interpret-
ing these findings.
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increase performance by setting goals.10 We attempt to learn whether students
who are present biased react stronger to the goal-setting treatment, and whether
there are differences between treatments. We measure time inconsistency using
the same hypothetical questions as used in Ashraf et al. (2006). We ask: ‘Would
you prefer to receive 15 euros guaranteed today, or 20 euros guaranteed in one month?’
and ‘Would you prefer to receive 15 euros guaranteed in 6 months, or 20 euros guaran-
teed in 7 months?’. Those students who prefer receiving the 15 euros now, and
prefer the 20 euros in 7 months are labeled time inconsistent (and are therefore
expected to be more often present biased). According to this definition 15.6%
(i.e., 180 students) of the sample is time inconsistent. We regress our main speci-
fication for both samples separately, and find no significant differences between
the samples, see Table A3.
Students have to (re)subscribe to their education program each year before a
certain deadline, and the university keeps track if and when students (re)sub-
scribe. We use the timing at which students subscribe in order to learn whether
students are procrastinators.11 Students neither have an incentive to (re)subscribe
early, nor have an incentive to wait until the deadline. Hence, procrastinators
will subscribe late, while others will either subscribe early or late. Therefore,
looking at the sample of students who subscribe late gives us a noisy estimate of
the treatment effect for procrastinating students.12 In order to do this, we
Table 9 Impact of the treatments on the difference in course motivation
Course motivation Course interesting Course useful
T1 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.14) (0.08) (0.09)
T2 0.30** 0.11 0.18**
(0.14) (0.07) (0.08)
T3 0.07 0.01 0.07
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07)
Goal treatments combined 0.10 0.02 0.09
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 675 675 675 675 675 675
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The sample consists of all students who completed at least the first
and second survey. The dependent variable is measured by the respondent’s answer to the questions:
To what extend do you agree with the following statements: ‘I find the course interesting’ and ‘I
think the course is useful’. Answers are measured on a 5-point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree, to
5 = Strongly agree. In the first two columns we took the average of the response to both questions.
Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics, study program, and GPA prior to
the experiment.
10. Present biased individuals are defined as individuals who place a higher value to current utility
than to future utility, see Stotz (1956). Present bias is a particular form of time inconsistency.
11. Procrastination is a good predictor of time-inconsistent behavior, see Reuben et al. (2015).
12. For a similar approach see Himmler et al. (2019).
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separate the sample and estimate our main specifications for both the group of
students who subscribe to the education program relatively early (i.e., below the
median date) and for those who subscribe relatively late (i.e., above the median).
We see that there are no significant differences between the groups, see Table 10.
5.3. Further results
5.3.1. Substitution and long-run effects
Besides the course used for the experiment, students take one other program
specific course at the same time. If the treatments increase students’ effort in the
course for which they set the goal, it may be that they substitute effort away
from the other course. Using the grades of these program-specific courses, we
find no effect of the treatments on the study performance of this other course,
i.e., we find no substitution effect, see Table 11 column 1 and 2.
We also study whether there are effects of our treatments on student perfor-
mance in later courses. This may happen when students change their study
behaviors in a way that benefits performance only later. We find, using the first
set of courses after the experiment that there is no difference between students
assigned to the control group and any of the treatment groups, see Table 11 col-
umn 3 and 4.
5.3.2. Satisfaction
While goal setting did not affect study performance much, it may have increased
students’ utility. First, because goal setting may allow students to not work too
hard, and thereby avoid stress which plays an important role in burnouts. Sec-
ond, by motivating students to set non-grade goals, students may have focused
on tasks that were not productive in increasing their grades. For instance, some
students choose to set non-grade goals such as: ‘I would like to become a better
Table 10 Heterogenous treatment effect: time preferences







Goal treatments combined 0.06 0.03
(0.05) (0.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1.047 1.047 1.029 1.029
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is standardized by subtracting the mean
and and dividing by the st.dev. Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics,
study program, and GPA prior to the experiment.
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decision maker’ or ‘learn more about economics’. Hence it may be that while
goal setting decreased study performance for some students it increased their
utility. Third, by making progress toward their goal (grade and/or non-grade
goals), students my increase their satisfaction, see e.g., Diener et al. (1999) and
Koestner et al. (2002).
In each survey wave, we asked students how satisfied they are with their per-
formance in the course and with their life in general. The questions we asked are
as follows: ‘How satisfied are you with: your study performance in [course name] so
far’ and ‘How satisfied are you with: your life in general’. Students answer on a 10-
point scale, ranging from 1 = Not at all satisfied, to 10 = Fully satisfied. We regress
the difference in satisfaction between surveys for the same student, on treatment
assignment, see Table 12.
We find no effect of the treatment on satisfaction with study performance,
although the coefficients are negative which is in line with the coefficients for
actual performance. Life satisfaction increases for students assigned to treatment
as compared to the control group. However, the size of the effect is marginally
significant and rather small.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We studied goal setting during university courses where students perceive high
levels of uncertainty initially about their potential performance, and where
through midterm exam, participation uncertainty is reduced over time. We asked
students to set goals using surveys and varied whether students were invited to
revise their goals, and the timing of this invitation. We find that on average goal
setting had no effect on study performance. Our findings are similar to Dobronyi
et al. (2017) who found also no effects of goal setting on performance using sur-
veys, but different from among others Morisano et al. (2010), Van Lent and
Table 11 The substitution effect and future performance
Dependent variable: Substitute Future








Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2.076 2.076 1.649 1.649
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Dependent variable is standardized by subtracting the mean and
dividing by the st.dev. Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics, study pro-
gram, and GPA prior to the experiment.
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Souverijn (2017), and Clark et al. (2018) who find positive effects from goal set-
ting on study performance. While statistical power is not an issue, there are sev-
eral other potential reasons for why we find that goal setting has no effect on
study performance on average.13
The treatment may not have been salient enough. We choose to make the sur-
veys in the control and treatment groups similar in order to avoid that students
and teachers felt like they were in an experiment. Hence, while both groups
received several questions regarding study behaviors and preferences, the only
difference between the treatment and control group was a couple of additional
questions regarding goal setting. It may therefore be that – although we
reminded students of their goals in all later surveys – the goal-setting interven-
tion was not salient enough. Comparing our intervention with other goal-setting
interventions at university, we see that the intervention in most of the studies
seems stronger.14
Students were not incentivized to take the survey seriously. Students were
asked to fill in the survey by their teacher, and in addition those who filled in all
surveys participated automatically in a lottery where they could win an Ipad.
These incentives were set in order to stimulate students to participate, however,
this may not have been sufficient for students to take the survey seriously. How-
ever, this is likely to be an issue in all goal-setting-related surveys or essays as
long as reaching the goal is not related to, for instance, a monetary incentive.
Hence, the absence of incentives seems not sufficient to explain the null result
in this study.
Table 12 Impact of the treatments on the difference in course and life satisfaction







Goal treatments combined 0.02 0.22*
(0.22) (0.12)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 745 745 745 745
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is measured by the respondent’s answer to
the question: How satisfied are you with. . . ‘your study performance in Microeconomics so far’ and
‘your life in general’. Answers are measured on a 10-point scale from 1 = Not at all satisfied, to
10 = Fully satisfied. Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics, study pro-
gram, and GPA prior to the experiment.
13. We are able to detect an effect size of 5.5% of a standard deviation.
14. In Dobronyi et al. (2017) and Schippers et al. (2015), for instance, students complete structured
goal-setting exercises.
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Another reason for results that deviate from most of the literature may be that
the student population in our study is different from those used in other goal
setting experiments at university. For instance, institutional, program, or recruit-
ing differences may have led to different students, and hence different results.
Morisano et al. (2010) target struggling students at a top Canadian university,
and Clark et al. (2018) target students at a public university in the United States.
However Van Lent and Souverijn (2017) do find significant effects of a goal-set-
ting intervention with participants of the same study program and university as
in this paper. One key difference between this paper and Van Lent and Souverijn
(2017) is that the latter paper elicits goals during a one-on-one conversation
between students and their mentor.
Finally, there is the possibility for treatment contamination. Students com-
plete the surveys in the classroom during tutorials taught by tutorial teachers.
Every student who is assigned to the same tutorial session received the same sur-
vey (i.e., within a tutorial group, students all received the control or one of the
treatment surveys). In addition to tutorials, students also have the opportunity
to attend lectures, taught by professors. Hence, although students mainly inter-
act with others in their tutorial group, we cannot rule out that (some) control
group students may have learned about goal setting from treated students. This
type of interaction could lead to treatment contamination. As a consequence, we
may be unable to detect treatment effects (since in fact also the control group is
treatment). While we cannot formally rule out that there was (some) contamina-
tion, there is also no evidence that students or teachers learned about the experi-
ment ex post.
Further inspection of the data shows that students who are behind on their
goals decrease their performance, but mainly so when students were not explic-
itly offered the opportunity to revise their goals. This suggests that if students set
goals that are too high, this hurts their performance to the extent that on aver-
age students setting goals are worse off. This finding may explain the mixed evi-
dence of the effects of goals on student performance in the literature. In
addition, our findings can be interpreted as a cautionary note for people who
would like to set long-run goals in settings containing a lot of uncertainty, such
as study related goals and career plans.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 Perceived uncertainty and goal revision





OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if a
student who set a goal in T2 or T3 revised a goal, and equals zero if that person did not revise a goal.
The variable: Uncertainty decreased is a dummy that equals one if the student’s perceived uncertainty
has decreased and zero if it has not. Control variables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteris-
tics, study program, and GPA prior to the experiment.











T1 0.11 0.10 0.07
(0.42) (0.83) (0.83)
T2 0.02 0.12 0.21
(0.37) (1.09) (1.03)






Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1.994 1.994 860 860 670 670
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the tutorial group level and in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The dependent variable is the number of times that students
attended tutorials and the self reported amount of hours studied on average per week. Control vari-
ables: student’s gender, tutorial teacher characteristics, study program, and GPA prior to the experi-
ment. The mean (st.dev) of the dependent variables are respectively, 7.76 (5.20), 15.25 (8.09), and
15.97 (8.91).
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